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T

he HALO Trust (HALO) has been working in Ukraine since
2015, a year after the hostilities in the east of the country

began. Both the ongoing conflict in the Donbas and tensions on the border with Russia have left large areas of land
contaminated with landmines and other explosive remnants of war
(ERW). In places where the frontline has moved on and the fighting
has stopped, mines and other ERW remain, preventing the lives of civilians from returning to normal.
HALO currently has around 400 full-time staff employed in
Ukraine and is conducting manual and mechanical clearance, nontechnical and technical survey, risk education, and some capacity
building with state authorities to enhance their capabilities to carry out humanitarian survey and data gathering. HALO’s program in
Ukraine is currently funded by the United States, United Kingdom,
Germany, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Finland, and has
received funding in the past from Switzerland, the Czech Republic,
and the European Union.

Image 1. Items found on HALO tasks. A TM-62 anti-vehicle
mine with fuze visible on the surface and side exposed
through excavation.
All images courtesy of The HALO Trust.

As in every part of the world, Ukraine has its own set of challenges that affect humanitarian mine clearance. The key challenges
facing humanitarian mine clearance in Ukraine relate to the main
threat types encountered: tripwire-initiated devices and both metaland minimum-metal anti-vehicle mines. There are additional challenges relating to the specifics of the Ukrainian context: demining in
an active conflict zone, working without explosives, and the extreme
weather conditions. New techniques and technology, some tried and
tested in other countries, are being explored. These are too numerous to list; however, we will discuss a few of the key ways HALO is
overcoming some of the challenges of conducting humanitarian mine
clearance in Ukraine.

Context
The two regions of Donetsk and Luhansk are currently in a de facto
state of division between the territory controlled by the government

Image 2: A RDG-5 hand grenade with a nylon tripwire.
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Figure 1. Maps showing the major movements of the non-government controlled areas from May 2014 to
March 2016 when the line of contact became more static.
of Ukraine and separatist non-government controlled areas (NGCA).
The terms of the Minsk ceasefire agreement created a 15 km (9.3 mi)
buffer zone on either side of the line of contact between the two opposing forces and forbade the stationing of heavy weaponry within
the zone. Despite the agreement, shelling and crossfire between both
sides occurs on an almost daily basis.
Land inside the buffer zone and on the line of contact is heavily
contaminated with landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO).
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While the location of the line of contact now remains largely static,
in 2014 and 2015 it was far more f luid with large areas of territory
regularly changing hands during the fighting. This has resulted in
widespread mine and UXO contamination, not just along the current line of contact but also within and outside of the buffer zone.
Additionally, civilians continue to live in areas where neither side
has full control, commonly referred to as the grey zone. Here the
threat from landmines and UXO is also prevalent.

Ukraine is a Party to the Anti-Personnel
Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and in 2018
received approval of its request to extend its
deadline to 1 June 2021 to clear its territory of all known anti-personnel minefields.
However, the extension request stated that
achieving these obligations was dependent
on “…completion of hostilities, restoration
of the constitutional order and gaining the
full control over the occupied territories,
including over the state border between
Ukraine and the Russian Federation.”1
Currently HALO is only able to work
in areas controlled by the government of
Ukraine and is working across both oblasts
inside and outside the buffer zone. HALO
is unable to work on the line of contact or
the grey zone but teams are working to survey and clear areas close by where the threat
of mines and UXO is affecting the civilian
population. Therefore the challenges outlined only refer to the areas within eastern
Ukraine where HALO works. They do not refer to the nature of the mine and ERW problem in areas of Ukraine where HALO is not
working: the grey zone, the line of contact
itself, and the NGCAs, which may differ in
terms of threat type.

Ukraine-Specific
Challenges

Operating in conflict-affected regions.

While the intensity of the conflict in Ukraine
has decreased since the heavy fighting of 2014,
indirect fire and shooting close to the line of

Figure 2. Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions showing HALO’s current area of operations.

contact remains a reality. HALO does not

lar areas is required before demining teams deploy close to the line of

of UXO, the SES is contacted and their assistance is requested.
Although this generally works well, the situation in Ukraine means
that the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capacity of the SES is
often over-stretched. In some cases the lead time between the discovery of an item and its removal can be a number of days. In cases
where the device poses a particular danger such as where a tripwireinitiated device is discovered, deminers have to be moved a safe
distance away to work elsewhere on the minefield. Where there is a
significant delay in a device’s destruction or removal the clearance

contact. If shelling occurs nearby or there has been a major escalation

strategy of the minefield can be disrupted.

work in areas where there is a threat of mines being relaid. However,
the buffer zone contains the most areas with mine contamination, and
this means there is a need to work in some areas that are only a few
kilometers from the line of contact. Although civilians and NGOs are
not deliberately targeted, working in such close proximity to the line
of contact does present a risk to demining teams from stray indirect
fire. Careful consideration of the security situation in those particu-

close to the minefield, work is suspended and teams moved in order
to guarantee the security of demining staff. HALO does not deploy
teams in those areas where there is a high threat of indirect fire or close
to active military positions; however, there are inevitably times when
demining teams within the buffer zone have to suspend work and are
moved as a safety precaution.
Destruction of items. Humanitarian demining operators do not
yet have access to explosives in Ukraine, nor permission to carry out
render-safe procedures. This hinders the work but is not an insurmountable problem. Rather than conducting demolitions, the destruction or removal of ERW requires close coordination with the
State Emergency Service (SES). When HALO finds a mine or item

Challenges in the Minefields

Non-technical and technical survey. The nature of mine clearance is that the majority of the time the mines remaining in a contaminated area are buried or concealed. Therefore in order to avoid
clearing land unnecessarily non-technical and technical survey
methods are used. Where minelaying has been conducted in a uniform pattern, technical survey methods can be useful. Technical
survey involves conducting limited clearance to find exactly where
a mine-line is, enabling the follow-up clearance of the minefield to
be more targeted and avoiding the need to clear areas far from the
identified pattern.
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Figure 3. Google Earth imagery of a surveyed minefield in Donetsk region. The
arrow indicates three visible lines created by a military mine laying machine.
The road is to the west and the tracks run in a south-easterly direction across
the field.

non-technical survey becomes ever more important. Where it can be difficult to establish a
pattern or logic to the minelaying through technical survey or the early stages of clearance, information from local communities and other
informants can often help mitigate this. A good
understanding of the tactical situation in a particular area at the time of the minelaying can often be far more effective than trying to rely on
traditional technical survey methods. Moreover,
there is an archive of high-quality satellite images of Ukraine available on Google Earth. Given
that the minelaying is relatively recent, predominantly 2014-2015, these images sometimes reveal evidence of minelaying that is no longer
visible on the ground. An example of this are the
tracks from a military minelaying machine, as

shown in Figure 3. Such imagery aids the accuracy of non-technical survey and can eventually
The type of minelaying in Ukraine varies between professionally
lead to more efficient clearance.
laid defensive belts placed in a clear uniform pattern, such as a line
Clearing tripwire-initiated devices and minimum-metof evenly spaced anti-vehicle mines across a field, and sporadic mineal mines. The most common devices encountered by HALO in
laying. The latter being due either to low-level tactical considerations
Ukraine are tripwire-initiated hand grenades, anti-personnel
dictating the logic of where small numbers of mines have been placed
bounding-fragmentation mines (OZM-72s), both metal-cased and
or because of nuisance minelaying conducted by non-professional
minimum-metal anti-vehicle mines (TM-62 and TM-62P), and disoldiers or combatants.
rectional fragmentation mines (generally the MON series of anThe prevalence of this sporadic minelaying can often severely limit
ti-group mines). There is also the threat of UXO, ranging from
the usefulness of technical survey. It is difficult to find a pattern when
small-caliber cannon rounds to large-caliber mortar rounds.
there was no pattern or where the logic of the minelaying was down
Furthermore, many minefields contain a combination of different
to tactical rather than geographic considerations relevant at the time.
threats. Open media sources document that anti-personnel blast
Even in the case of defensive minefields laid in a clear uniform
mines such as PMN-2s and MS-3s, along with a range of improvised
pattern by professional military units, an operator’s ability to condevices and booby-traps, have also been used in the conflict, but at
duct technical survey can be limited if a large number of mines
the time of writing HALO has not found these types of items during
have already been removed by military forces or the local populaits clearance operations in Ukraine.
tion. These minefields still require clearance because some mines
The possibility of a wide variety of threat types, including tripmay have been missed. However, by removing mines from an area,
wire-initiated devices, has to be considered when clearing an area.
the original pattern becomes obscured and establishing where the
Of land currently surveyed by HALO and remaining to be cleared,
mine-line was can be difficult. This can result in larger amounts of
75 percent has a potential tripwire threat. The remaining 25 percent
clearance needing to be conducted in order to find a relatively small
are anti-vehicle mine-only tasks, of which 12 percent are minimumamount of mines.
metal mines and 13 percent are metal-cased mines.
Aids to non-technical survey. In cases where minelaying is spoMinefields that involve the clearance of tripwires, or minimumradic and the benefits of technical survey are limited, good quality
metal anti-vehicle mines, are slower to clear than land with metal
Average clearance rates in m2 by threat type
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Figure 4. Graph showing comparative speed of clearance rates measure in the square meters cleared, per team, per month.
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Image 3 and 4: A Large Loop Detector used for clearing anti-vehicle mines (left) in contrast to a deminer conducting tripwire clearance (right).
anti-vehicle mines only, without the threat from tripwire devices.
Additionally, unlike many countries with a historic legacy of mine
contamination, most of the tripwires in Ukraine are still intact, having only been laid within the last five years and being made of either
metal or nylon. This means metal detectors cannot be relied upon
alone as a means of searching for tripwires. As a result, a visual drill
involving the use of a fiber rod to guide the eye followed by the incremental removal of vegetation is required. This is intrinsically slow
when compared with clearance methods for other threat types (as
shown in Figure 4).
In minefields where there is only a threat of metal anti-vehicle
mines, deminers can conduct clearance by walking over the suspect
ground with a large-loop metal detector with the sensitivity calibrated to the mine-type. Deminers then manually investigate metal signals. This process enables clearance rates of over 50,000 sq m
(59,8000 sq yd) per team per month. This process is slowed, however,
when the threat of tripwire-initiated devices is also a possibility. In

such instances the slower tripwire search must be conducted across
the minefield before a large-loop detector can be used to look for the
buried anti-vehicle mines. Therefore, what would ordinarily be a relatively fast method of clearance is slowed to an average rate of 5,000 sq
m (5,980 sq yd) per team per month, by the presence or suspicion of
tripwire-initiated devices.
The clearance of areas where the threat of minimum metal antivehicle mines is suspected also poses challenges and is often slow compared with searching for metal-cased mines. This is due to the need to
use more sensitive detectors to locate the mines, which inevitably also
results in more signals from small metallic clutter being picked up that
have to be investigated through manual soil excavation to determine
whether a threat exists. This problem is exacerbated by contamination
from shelling thereby increasing the levels of metal clutter in the soil.
Moreover, Ukraine’s famously fertile chernozem soil is heavily mineralized, further limiting the range of suitable detectors. While the challenge of searching for minimum-metal mines is not unique to Ukraine,
in places where this threat is combined with
a need to search for tripwire-initiated devices, it results in a significantly more timeconsuming process when compared with
clearing other types of mines.

New Detectors

Image 5. A deminer using a ‘Minelab UXO-head’ detector, searching for minimummetal plastic cased anti-vehicle mines.

HALO is anticipating deploying a team
with combined ground penetrating radar
(GPR) and metal detectors in 2019. The GPR
detectors should enable metallic clutter to
be distinguished from anti-vehicle mines.
By being able to better distinguish between
clutter and the profile of an anti-vehicle
mine, teams can rapidly excavate clutter,
leaving the remaining signals to be excavated as per standard procedures. This should
increase the efficiency of clearing antivehicle minefields where there are large
amounts of metal fragmentation from shelling. Such detectors have had a significant
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make excavations incredibly slow and grueling. Enabling
work to continue in such conditions relies on using creative methods and respecting the tough conditions the
teams are working in. Ensuring teams are equipped with
suitable clothing and boots and have the facilities and
time required to warm up on the minefields is fundamental. In such conditions it is crucial to ensure deminers are able to maintain concentration to ensure safe and
efficient work.
Mechanical assets. HALO Ukraine is building its mechanical capacity and currently the program has two
front loaders and is looking into further mechanical options. The front loaders are currently being used to clear
areas such as former military positions that are difficult
and slow for manual teams. Having a mechanical capacity also enables some clearance teams to be deployed
through the winter months.
Figure 5. A diagram demonstrating the ‘quadrat’ method.
impact in other HALO programs such as Afghanistan, where in some
places it has decreased the number of manual excavations required by
over 90 percent, it is hoped the same success will be true for Ukraine.

Incremental Changes to Drills

Seemingly small innovations can make drastic differences to clearance rates. An example of this is the quadrat method, using a 2-by2 m (2.19-by-2.19 yd) boxing drill where lanes are cleared using the
standard manual trip-wire search drill to create boxes over which a
detector can be swept but without the need to use a fiber rod to slowly
inspect the area inside the box. The size of the box and the fact it is surrounded by cleared ground negates the presence of tripwires that are
not clearly visible and sweeping a detector over the top ensures there
is no device without a tripwire on the surface. Innovations such as this
have made the existing drill faster without compromising on safety.

2019 will see the trial and deployment of lightly armored remote vegetation cutters. The objective of these
machines is to support manual teams by cutting the
vegetation ahead of their progress on a task. It is expected this will
improve the efficiency of the drill by speeding up one of the most
time-consuming parts of the process: the careful investigation and
removal of vegetation. Depending on the success of these machines,
a lighter equivalent will be considered with the aspiration to deploy
them onto minefields where there is a mixed threat of devices such as
tripwires and anti-vehicle mines.
Melting frozen ground. During winter, fires are lit in safe areas
within the minefields to heat up a saline solution and provide warmth
during breaks. The saline solution is used to thaw frozen ground.
When a metal signal has been identified and isolated, the hot liquid
is then poured over the soil. The ground is then covered with cut vegetation, which acts as insulation trapping the warmth. This process
enables the ground to thaw overnight and makes soil excavations
possible the following day.

Challenges From
Extreme Climate

Over the course of a year in Ukraine the
temperature can vary across 60 C, and these
extremes pose additional challenges for mine
clearance. In the summer, temperatures on
minefields can reach 40 C (104 F), and over
the course of the long winter the temperature can drop to -20 C (-4 F). In January and
February, the months with the most extreme
weather, only the mechanical clearance teams
can work. Snow makes effective and safe tripwire clearance impossible, and the short days
and freezing temperatures can often inhibit
clearance on tripwire minefields for even longer from November to March.
The cold conditions also affect other aspects of clearance. Snow and frozen ground
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Image 6. A HALO Ukraine front loader conducting mechanical mine clearance
in challenging winter conditions.
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Image 7. A deminer excavating through defrosted ground.

Image 8. Deminers warming up in sub-zero conditions, to
the left is a barrel of saline solution.

Looking Ahead

Beyond security and access restrictions, the primary challenges
of conducting humanitarian mine clearance in Ukraine are from
tripwire-initiated devices and minimum-metal anti-vehicle mines.
HALO Ukraine is developing both technical and human methods
to overcome the challenges posed and to increase the efficiency of
clearing land. This involves using techniques and technology used
elsewhere in the world but also requires the trialing of new ideas
and innovations. Similarly, the challenges of working within the
context of Ukraine are, where possible, also mitigated and overcome through innovative means and where necessary through liaison with state bodies.
Ultimately the importance of optimizing clearance rates and
increasing the efficiency of HALO’s work in Ukraine is to remove
life-threatening hazards from ERW contaminated land. The more efficiently minefields can be cleared the faster land can be returned for
use by landowners and the community. Restoring land to its original
state helps the lives and livelihoods of those living in affected areas
return to normal.
Although seeking new innovations is important, the majority of the work is ultimately done by Ukrainian men and women.
High-quality training provides the skills required to clear the land.
Oversight and guidance from experienced demining team leaders
and supervisors in the field ensures that safety is maintained and the
quality and thoroughness of HALO’s clearance remains to the highest standards. It is therefore the quality of HALO’s personnel that is
the most important factor. Developing their skills and building their
experience allows HALO to deliver its lifesaving work despite the
challenges faced within Ukraine.

See endnotes page 69
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